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Abstract 
This paper, based on econometric techniques, has done a study to improve the predictions of the stress test, concerning 
the estimation of impairment losses. The main results obtained are: 1) the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
impairment loss is different at stages of growth, compared to times of recession; 2) there is a certain inertia of the de-
pendent variable, but this inertia is different in intensity, and even the sign in the growth stages concerning the stages 
of recession; 3) of the explanatory variables, nominal GDP and equity are those that have a greater impact on the im-
pairment loss; 4) finally, the two dummy variables that assess the impact of adjustment to market value of assets in the 
process of mergers and acquisitions that occurred in 2010, and regulatory changes implemented in 2012, have been 
statistically significant and with the expected signs. 
Keywords: econometric techniques, financial crisis, financial markets, risks. 
JEL Classification: G21, G32, G17. 
Introduction  
In recent years, there has been a generalized use and 
disclosure of the stress test. The aim is to provide se-
curity to financial markets, a sector that is significantly 
affected by rumors. According to Til Schuermann 
(2014) and Nyoka (2015), one of the consequences of 
the recent financial crisis is that the standard methods, 
such as regulatory capital ratios, are no longer reliable. 
Investors need reliable tools to examine the possibility 
of investing in a credit institution, especially when it 
may be subject to impairment. In this way, they can 
estimate the results according to the actual risks as-
sumed (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). As an example of 
the need for this information, you can check with the 
significant economic consequences of this crisis. Ac-
cording to Conlon and Cotter (2014), the injection of 
public funds in failed European banks totalled 535,000 
million euros in the last financial crisis. 
However, stress tests have not shown that this tool is 
reliable. The stress test should improve in transpar-
ency issues of methodology the forecasts should be 
probabilistic (Basu, 2013). The lack of success in the 
prediction of the stress test has been shown in the 
case of Spanish credit institutions (CNMV, 2011; 
Wyman, 2012). 
The three years covered by the Oliver Wyman report 
has been that higher impairment losses suffered by the 
Spanish financial system in all their history, and by 
far. Thus, from 2008 to 2013, the impairment losses 
according to the Bank of Spain in the Spanish finan-
cial system totalled 238,430 million euros and, how-
ever, from 1971 to 2007, they totalled only 76,899 
million euros. In conclusion, in 37 years were only 
one-third compared in the latter five years (Climent 
and Pavía, 2015a). 
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Therefore, to estimate forecasts, it is necessary to con-
sider many factors, because conditions may change 
over time. The prediction data obtained in times of 
growth may not be valid for times of crisis. Not only 
by the change in the value of variables, of course, but 
also by the change in the value of the coefficients 
applied to the variables (Ruby and Opiela, 2015). 
The aim is to propose a new model for improvement 
of the stress test. This new framework will consist of 
various econometric models. The main aspects that 
should be taken into consideration are the weaknesses 
that have been detected, especially in the Oliver 
Wyman report 2012 for the Bank of Spain, these are: 
The differential effect between periods of crisis 
and recession. 
The choice of representative variables, given that 
the correlation between some of the variables in-
validates the econometric macromodels. 
The inclusion of internal variables, because the 
investigation has shown to have an important in-
fluence on the prediction of future results. 
The selected type of econometric model. 
As a new contribution to the literature, ad hoc eco-
nomic models for each stage are presented and inter-
nal variables of credit institutions are added to the 
usual macroeconomic variables.  
The main results indicate that the forecasts of the 
Oliver Wyman report very significantly overestimate 
the impairment losses of the credit institutions evalu-
ated, unlike those of the CEBS and the EBA, which 
very significantly underestimated impairment losses. 
So, the Oliver Wyman report caused an increase in 
capital requirements and an excess of financial panic, 
which led to the request of the financial bailout of up 
to 100,000 million euros by the Spanish state.  
Another of the main results indicate that the impact of 
the variables is different in growth stages with respect 
to steps recession. A structural break occurs in the 
turning of the business cycle, in 2008. Inertia of the 
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dependent variable exists, but this is different in inten-
sity and sign in stages of growth and recession.  
Results can be used to predict the evolution of the 
losses due to default of the credit institutions, adjust-
ing the estimates to the stage of the economy. More-
over, with the result obtained with the elasticities, 
future developments in the credit institutions may be 
analyzed.
The rest of the article continues as follows: the first 
section is studying the background, and a literature 
review is performed, in the second, the methodology 
and data used are presented, the third outlines the re-
sults obtained and, in the final, conclusions are pre-
sented. 
1. Background and literature review 
The last global financial crisis and its consequences 
(high unemployment and slow growth) have promoted 
macro-prudential regulation, with the aim of reducing 
risks in the financial system, and social and economic 
costs (Covas, Rump and Zakrajšek, 2014). These costs 
in Spain have been very important: more than 25% of 
GDP, and an unemployment rate that exceeded 26%, 
in addition to countless families evicted from their 
homes, because they could not deal with their loan 
instalments. 
According to Hirtle, Schuermann and Stiroh (2009), 
Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011), Coffinet, Pop and 
Tiesset (2012), Bellini (2013) and Sahin and de Haan 
(2016), stress tests in recent years have become an 
indispensable part of the toolbox used by central banks 
and other regulators to conduct macro-prudential regu-
lation and supervision. 
There are also numerous criticisms of the stress test, 
especially after the lack of success in the forecasts 
made in 2009 and 2010 by the CEBS (CEBS, 2009) 
and the EBA in 2011 (EBA, 2011) and the conse-
quences of public disclosure to entity level (Banerjee, 
and Maier, 2016). Regarding the lack of reliability, 
Alfaro and Drehmann (2009) and Borio, Drehmann 
and Tsatsaronis (2014) argue that the current tech-
niques of stress tests are not adequate to identify new 
financial imbalances and weaknesses before they ap-
pear. Other authors such as Turner (2009), de 
Larosière (2009), Galati and Moessner (2013), Cerutti 
and Schmieder (2014), and Zenios and Panayi (2015) 
are of the opinion that the stress tests were not infor-
mative enough and did not give an adequate response 
to prevent the global financial crisis. This situation 
was demonstrated in the EBA and CEBS stress tests. 
Despite the criticism, Petrella, Resti (2013) and Borrio 
et al. (2014) state that if the stress tests are designed 
properly, they can be very effective for good crisis 
management. They can also help financial stability. 
These authors advocate introducing the internal vari-
ables in the models econometrics as increases in credit 
and asset prices. In the model presented in this paper, 
internal variables related to the health of banks have 
been included.  
The seminal work of Wilson (1998) stresses that all 
the credits must be recognized that can potentially 
become defaults in a certain time, in a particular eco-
nomic scenario. Berkowitz (1999) proposed a meth-
odology of stress tests with two independent prognos-
tic distributions: one for normal conditions and one 
that reflects stress conditions, based on changes in an 
underlying factor. This approach produces two sets of 
projections, one of the stress tests and one of the basic 
model. The choice of scenarios is a matter of utmost 
importance, so manifest, among others: Hu, Yan, 
Zhao and Hua (2014), Abdymomunov and Gerlach 
(2014) and de Souza, Silva, Tabak and Guerra (2016). 
In a work performed by Vázquez, Tabak and Soutoa 
(2012) with panel data in the financial sector in Brazil, 
main results indicate the negative relationship between 
NPLs and GDP growth. This study also investigated 
the addition of independent explanatory variables with 
lags, with good results. In this case also, they affect 
the variability of results depending on time. The au-
thors claim that history rarely repeats itself and the 
circumstances surrounding the shocks are almost al-
ways different. 
Schechtman and Gaglianone (2012), as well as Covas, 
Rump and Zakrajšek (2014) argue that quarterly data 
models improve the estimates. However, in the Span-
ish case, the model with quarterly data predictions 
worsens, since, according to Climent (2016), impair-
ment losses have a marked quarterly seasonality, very 
pronounced in the fourth quarter, which would invali-
date the model. 
Shechtman and Gaglianone (2012) use models with 
aggregate data of the credit system. The dependent 
variable is the default. The stress test is based on the 
household sector in Brazil. The main results empha-
size that the unemployment rate produces a more det-
rimental effect, while the rate of inflation and interest 
rates in the most stressed scenarios show a greater 
impact. In this case, it is verified that certain variables 
may have different effects in times of growth com-
pared to recessions. Studying these different impacts 
in impairment losses at the different economic stages 
is one of the objectives of this work. Other stud-
ies have estimated the losses of a particular port-
folio, e.g., Bellotti and Crook (2013) and Kelly 
and O’Malley (2016).  
Buncic and Melecky (2013) focus their work on the 
credit institutions of the Eastern countries. The authors 
claim that stress tests have to be done during periods 
of benign conditions. Covas, Rump and Zakrajšek 
(2014) use panel data on a dynamic model of OLS 
with fixed effects for estimating impairment losses for 
15 large US banks. Ghosh (2015) and Ju, Jeon and 
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Sohn (2015) recommended that stress tests regarding 
the impairment of loans should take into account the 
impact of microeconomic conditions, in addition to 
the equity of banks, credit quality and financial health 
of banks. These variables are included in the econo-
metric models of this work. 
Other examples of work on stress tests can be seen in 
Kalirai and Scheicher (2002), Virolainen (2004), Boss, 
Krenn, Puhr and Schwaiger (2007), Huang, Zhou and 
Zhu (2009, 2012), Jiménez and Mencía (2009), Cas-
tren, Dees and Zaher (2010), and Breuer, Jandacka, 
Mencía and Summer (2012). 
2. Methodology and data 
2.1. Dependent variable. The impairment losses of 
the credit institutions have been chosen as a dependent 
variable. The evolution of impairment losses on the 
credit institutions during the studied period 2004-2014 
is shown in Figure 1. 
Source: authors. 
Fig. 1. Evolution of impairment losses in the period 2004 to 2014 
Figure 1 also shows the high volatility of impair-
ment losses. There are two years who have singu-
larities: in 2011, it decreased significantly compared 
to 2010, without having a relationship with the ex-
planatory variables (Climent Serrano and Pavía, 
2014). This is due to the fact that in 2010, most of 
these credit institutions made corporate operations, 
and updated their assets at market value (Climent and 
Pavía, 2015b), so they advanced the impairment 
losses, which caused a decrease in 2011. By another 
party to 2012, new rules were implemented causing a 
increase to impairment losses. 
2.2. Explanatory variables. To estimate impairment 
losses, we first studied the variables that have been 
used in the Oliver Wyman report. However, as shown 
in Table 1, there are strong correlations between them; 
this causes multicollinearity problems when estimat-
ing regressions. 
The first column of Table 1 ‘Impairment losses’ 
shows the correlation between the impairment losses 
and the rest of the variables. As mentioned in the pre-
vious paragraph regarding the problems of multicol-
linearity, ability to carry out regression models exter-
nal variables has been significantly reduced. 
There is a strong correlation between nominal GDP, 
the price of land, the price of homes and the unem- 
ployment rate. Also, between the CPI and the deflato-
rand between them and the GDP. Moreover, nominal 
GDP is the combination of real GDP and CPI, so that 
nominal GDP has been chosen to represent all these 
variables. The variables that represent the interest rates 
(Euribor 3M, 12M and 10-year debt), such as the ex-
change rate and increases in loans, are not significant 
in econometric models. Therefore, as external vari-
ables, nominal GDP and the index of the Madrid 
Stock Exchange have been chosen. 
Moreover, as has been shown in the literature review, 
in addition to external variables, there are also impor-
tant internal variables to determine the amount of im-
pairment. The internal variables used following the 
authors studied in the literature are the equity and the 
profit rate. 
Two dummy variables are also included. The first 
represents the change of legal regulations which sub-
stantially modified the amount of impairment losses 
that credit institutions should make; this variable is 
equal to 1 in 2012, and zero in other periods. The sec-
ond is the mergers of 2010, in which credit institutions 
restated assets at market prices, significantly reducing 
impairment losses in 2011. In this case, the variable is 
set to 1 in 2011, and zero in other periods. 






































              
Real GDP -0.40*** 1
Nominal 
GDP 
-0.33*** 0.96*** 1 
            
Unemploy-
ment Rate 
0.43*** -0.77*** -0.80*** 1 
           
Harmonized 
CPI 
-0.05*** 0.56*** 0.47*** -0.11*** 1 
     
GDP 
deflator 
0.21*** 0.42*** 0.54*** -0.44*** 0.29*** 1 
         
Land prices -0.37*** 0.84*** 0.82*** -0.89*** 0.35*** 0.49*** 1 
Housing 
prices 
-0.40*** 0.83*** 0.82*** -0.86*** 0.37*** 0.54*** 0.85*** 1 
       
Euribor, 3 
months 
-0.33*** 0.62*** 0.67*** -0.81*** 0.25*** 0.32*** 0.63*** 0.57*** 1 
      
Euribor, 12 
months 
-0.34*** 0.67*** 0.71*** -0.85*** 0.27*** 0.37*** 0.68*** 0.64*** 0.99*** 1 




0.28*** -0.10** 0.09* 0.25*** -0.13*** 0.12** -0.40*** -0.31*** -0.08 -0.11** 1 




0.03 -0.438*** -0.39*** 0.15*** -0.52*** -0.38*** -0.26*** -0.43*** 0.09* 0.03 -0.09* 1 















-0.276*** 0.45*** 0.44*** -0.64*** -0.11*** 0.09*** 0.54*** 0.23*** 0.71*** 0.70*** -0.18*** 0.37*** 0.55*** 0.25*** 1 
Source: authors. 
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The results obtained in these few variables explain 
about 80% of the results, and, therefore, can be con-
sidered good predictors. 
2.3. Source data. The data for the internal variables 
used are taken from the annual accounts and reports of 
the 14 entities which underwent the stress test, includ-
ing all entities previously merged from 2004-2014, a 
total of 68 credit institutions. The data of macroeco-
nomic variables were obtained from the databases of 
INE, the Bank of Spain, the Ministry of Development 
and the CIS (Sociological Research Centre). 
The variables used in the models are: 
2.4. Impairment losses. This is the dependent vari-
able. It is presented as a ratio where the numerator is 
the sum of three accounts: 1) impairment losses on 
financial assets; 2) impairment losses on other assets; 
and 3) gains (losses) on non-current assets for sale, not 
classified as discontinued operations. In the denomina-
tor, the assets of the credit institution. 
Equity. Ratio of equity over assets. 
ROA. Ratio of net profit relative to assets. 
Nominal GDP. Variation rate of nominal GDP pub-
lished by the Bank of Spain. 
Madrid Stock Exchange. Rate of change of the index 
of the Madrid Stock Exchange. 
Regulations. Dummy variable representing the 
change in the rules of allocation of impairment losses. 
Corporate operations. Dummy variable representing 
mergers and acquisitions that occurred in 2010. This 
takes the value 1 in 2011, and zero in the remaining 
years.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the va- 
riables.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Impairment losses Nominal GDP Madrid Stock Exchange Equity ROA
Mean 0.006873 0.038865 0.000475 0.058065 0.002162
Median 0.004223 0.062400 0.157529 0.056180 0.005483
Maximum 0.088705 0.077800 0.256423 0.140936 0.023892
Minimum -0.002634 -0.021100 -0.682439 -0.059016 -0.201299
Std. dev. 0.009632 0.036269 0.294397 0.022182 0.020590
Source: prepared by author. 
2.5. Econometric models. The developed economet-
ric models are based on unbalanced panel data. Model 
1 was estimated using fixed effects after completing 
the homogeneity test and Hausman. These models 
combine cross-sections for various periods of time, so 
they have more data and can keep track of each indi-
vidual. When using the fixed effects model, waste or 
errors are broken down into two parts, one part fixed 
constant for each individual ( i), and another part 
random ( it). This is equivalent to get a general ten-
dency to regression, giving each credit institution a 
different point of origin on the vertical axis. 
Model 1 
Impairment losses = i + it + it Nominal GDP +  
+ itMadrid Stock Exchange + it Equity + it ROA +  
+ itRegulations + it Corporate operations + it.
When studying the Durbin–Watson statistic, it could 
be that the model had some correlation of first order in 
waste; therefore, some inertia of the dependent vari-
able may exist in the previous year on the current pe-
riod. Hence, two new models have been estimated, 
with AR1 and General Method of Moments, Models 2 
and 3.
Model 2 
Impairment losses = i + it + it Nominal GDP + 
+ itMadrid Stock Exchange + it Equity + it ROA + 
itRegulations + it Corporate operations + it
AR (1) + it.
Model 3
Impairment losses = i + it + it Impairment losses t-
1 + it Nominal GDP + itMadrid Stock Exchange +
it Equity + it ROA + itRegulations + it Corporate 
operations+ it.
All three models were estimated for the entire sample 
and for two subsamples, 2004-2008 and 2009-2014, 
with the aim of checking whether there is structural 
change between the two periods and significant differ-
ences in the coefficients. 
Moreover, according to data obtained from VIF (vari-
ance inflation factor), these models have managed to 
eliminate the problems of multicollinearity. All mod-
els were estimated using robust standard errors hetero-
scedasticity. 
Results 
Table 3 shows the results of the different models. For 
each variable, the first row shows the coefficient, 
which being a linear model represents the marginal 
propensity; in the second row and in brackets, robust 
standard errors are shown; and in the third row and 
in square brackets, the elasticity of the explanatory 
variable is shown. 
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Table 3. Econometric models 




2004-2008 2009-2014 2004-2014 2004-2008 2009-2014 2004-2014 2004-2008 2009-2014 
C 
0.014*** 0.009** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.013287* 0.017*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Impairment 
losses t-1 
-0.067*** -1.471 -0.042 
(0.021) (1.840) (0.028) 
Nominal 
GDP 
-0.026*** 0.004 -0.142* -0.029*** 0.002 -0.026* -0.023*** -0.015 -0.087*** 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.004) (0.064) (0.017) 




-0.000*** -0.005*** -0.017* -0.002* -0.005*** 0.001 -0.001** -0.008 -0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) 
[-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.001] [-0.000] [-0.000] [0.000) [-0.000] [-0.000] [-0.000] 
Equity 
-0.097*** -0.068* -0.150*** -0.094*** -0.147 -0.148*** -0.191*** 0.047 -0.209*** 
(0.031) (0.039) (0.046) (0.033) (0.116) (0.043) (0.012) (0.439) (0.011) 
[-0.816] [-0.574] [-1.268] [-0.799] [-1.188] [-1.235] [-1.618] [-1.256] [-1.767] 
ROA 
-0.290*** -0.096 -0.279*** -0.296*** -0.063 -0.280*** -0.304*** 0.821 -0.326*** 
(0.032) (0.195) (0.033) (0.032) (0.173) (0.008) (0.017) (4.201) (0.015) 
[-0.091] [-0.030] [-0.088] [-0.093] [-0.020] [-0.088] [-0.096] [0.258] [-0.103] 
Regula-
tions 
0.007*** 0.005* 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Corporate 
operations 
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(1) 
-0.151** 0.396** -0.331*** 
(0.072) (0.152) (0.124) 
R2 Corr. 0.79 0.38 0.77 0.81 0.40 0.82 35.32 0.001 23.97 
resid 2 0.007 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.009 
Akaike -7.84 -8.78 -6.85 -7.83 -8.61 -7.06 
F-stad. 21.53*** 3.83*** 8.46*** 21.77*** 3.35 10.35 
Durbin–
Watson 
2.30 1.53 3.65 2.12 1.97 3.31 36 6 30 
n  424 266 158 356 211 145 291 157 134 
Source: level of significance: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. Robust standard errors are in brackets using White. The elasticities are 
between square brackets. 
According to the results, it appears that the impact of 
the explanatory variables on the impairment losses 
varies at different stages of growth and the recession. 
According to the Chow test, a structural change is 
produced in 2008 and the difference in coefficients 
between the two sub-periods is statistically significant 
in all the variables, except equity of the model AR (1). 
The level of significance R-square corrected is quite 
high, especially in models that cover the entire sam-
ple, and the period of recession. One issue that is 
postponed for future research is to study whether the 
change in the explanatory variables for each of the 
sub-periods, can improve estimates of the first pe-
riod. This means that not only the impact of the ex-
planatory variables is different in each of the periods, 
but also the explanatory variables would be different. 
When studying the sign of the correlation according 
to the Durbin–Watson statistic and coefficient AR 
(1), it shows that the sign changes depending on the 
stage. In the stages of economic growth 2004-2008, 
the sign is positive, that is, there is a positive inertia 
in the impairment losses in accordance with the pre-
vious period. However, in times of recession, 2009-
2014, the opposite happens as the inertia is negative. 
This may be motivated by smoothing the profits, and 
this circumstance has already been detected in other 
studies such as Bikker and Metzemakers (2005), and 
Bouvatier, Lepetit and Strobel (2014). 
When nominal GDP increases, impairment losses 
decrease. This relationship occurs in the full sample 
and the sample includes the period of recession. 
However, it is not significant in the growth stage. In 
this aspect, future research should study different 
variables for different stages. According to the elas-
ticity, the effect is greater in the stages of recession 
with respect to growth. The impact of elasticity in 
the nominal GDP in the model with the full sample 
is 0.15%. That is, an increase of 1% in the nominal 
GDP translates into a decrease in impairment losses 
of 0.15%. 
An increase in the index of the Madrid Stock Ex-
change decreased impairment losses on assets of 
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credit institutions. In this case, in seven of the nine 
estimated models, it is statistically significant. Al-
though the impact is very small, the elasticity is close 
to zero in all models. 
The solvency of credit institutions, measured by the 
amount of equity capital, is one of the variables that 
has the greatest impact on the evolution of impairment 
losses. Also, it is statistically significant in seven of 
the nine models. The elasticity is around the unit, de-
pending on the stage, being greater in times of reces-
sion relative to the growth stages. According to the 
results of elasticity, a credit institution in which the 
equity is 1% higher than the other has 1% less im-
pairment losses, being greater in times of recession 
than growth. The effect of ROA has the same sign, but 
lower strength: elasticity is about 0.1. 
The two dummy variables are also statistically signifi-
cant, verifying that the impairment losses decreased in 
2011 because of the upgrade market value of the as-
sets in 2010 in almost all credit institutions, and with 
the positive sign in the coefficient of the dummy vari-
able, representing the year 2012 as a result of regula-
tory changes that took place. 
Conclusions 
The stress test in recent years has become widespread 
as a tool to evaluate the solvency of credit institutions. 
However, reliability should be improved in terms of 
results and transparency in terms of methodology. 
Recent published reports have underestimated the 
capital requirements, such as those of the CEBS in 
2009 and the EBA in 2010, or have overestimated 
these capital requirements, such as BdE conducted by 
Oliver Wyman in 2012. 
This paper has conducted a study to improve predic-
tions of the reports regarding the estimation of im-
pairment losses based on econometric techniques. 
The dependent variable is the impairment losses on 
credit institutions and the explanatory variables are 
divided into three types: 1) economic, nominal GDP 
and the index of the Madrid Stock Exchange; 2) inter-
nal credit institutions, equity and ROA; and 3) dummy 
variables. 
Only two economic variables have been chosen due to 
the multicollinearity problems that occur when more 
variables are included, and because these variables 
accounted for the majority of the explained variance of 
the model. The internal variables are most important 
in terms of solvency and the most used in the review 
of the literature as well. The dummies are used to 
reflect the impact of certain circumstantial events that 
have occurred during the period of investigation. 
Three types of econometric models have been used: 
OLS, the model AR (1) and MMG. In each of the 
three, three estimates have been made, one with the 
full sample, 2004-2014, and two subdivisions of the 
same, 2004-2008 and 2009-2014. 
The main results are: 
The R-square corrected obtained indicates that the 
models are good estimators/predictors of the impair-
ment losses suffered by banks. 
The impact of the explanatory variables on the im-
pairment losses varies in different stages of growth, 
compared to times of recession. 
There is a certain inertia of the dependent variable, but 
this inertia is different in intensity, and even the sign 
changes in the stages of growth, compared to the 
stages of recession. 
Nominal GDP is a statistically significant variable for 
the impairment losses, with an elasticity less than 
unity. The stock market price index is also a signifi-
cant variable; however, in this case, the elasticity is 
close to zero. 
The equity is the most important variable influencing 
the impairment losses, with an elasticity greater than 
unity. The profits are also important, but with a lower 
elasticity.
Finally, two dummy variables have been introduced to 
study the impact of upgrading to market value assets 
in the process of mergers and acquisitions that oc-
curred in 2010, and regulation changes implemented 
in 2012. The two variables are statistically significant 
and the results show expected signs. 
In the present work, variables were standardized for 
the three types of subsamples. Future research, having 
observed these results should investigate which vari-
ables are most important in each of the stages, since it 
may be that for each of the three subsamples studied, 
coinciding with growth stage, recession, and a combi-
nation of both, that the most significant variables were 
different, because some of them at some stages were 
not significant. This way the results could be com-
pared with those of this work, which has chosen to 
standardize the variables for the three samples. 
Future research: the aim for future research is to 
study whether the change in the explanatory variables 
for each of the sub-periods, can improve estimates of 
the first period. This means that not only the impact of 
the explanatory variables is different in each of the 
periods, but also the explanatory variables would be 
different. 
Implications of the study: Reality has shown that the 
current credibility of the stress test is not good. Recent 
EBA stress test of 29 July 2016 published conferred 
an excellent level of solvency to all banks, especially 
Spanish. However, the impact on the stock market 
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 11, Issue 3, 2016
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price on the banks of this report was a drop in the 
European banking sector 5.10% and 7.1% in Spain. 
So, it is clear that the application of tools, such as this 
paper, can improve their credibility. 
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